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Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics

CLAIRE BISHOP

The Palais de Tokyo
On the occasion of its opening in 2002, the Palais de Tokyo immediately
struck the visitor as different from other contemporary art venues that had
recently opened in Europe. Although a budget of 4.75 million euros was spent on
converting the former Japanese pavilion for the 1937 World’s Fair into a “site for
contemporary creation,” most of this money had been used to reinforce (rather
than renovate) the existing structure.1 Instead of clean white walls, discreetly
installed lighting, and wooden floors, the interior was left bare and unfinished.
This decision was important, as it reflected a key aspect of the venue’s curatorial
ethos under its codirectorship by Jerôme Sans, an art critic and curator, and
Nicolas Bourriaud, former curator at CAPC Bordeaux and editor of the journal
Documents sur l’art. The Palais de Tokyo’s improvised relationship to its surroundings
has subsequently become paradigmatic of a visible tendency among European art
venues to reconceptualize the “white cube” model of displaying contemporary art
as a studio or experimental “laboratory.”2 It is therefore in the tradition of what
1.
Palais de Tokyo promotional and Website, “site de création contemporaine,” <http://www.palaisdetokyo.com>
2.
For example, Nicolas Bourriaud on the Palais de Tokyo: “We want to be a sort of interdisciplinary
kunstverein—more laboratory than museum” (quoted in “Public Relations: Bennett Simpson Talks with
Nicolas Bourriaud,” Artforum [April 2001], p. 48); Hans Ulrich Obrist: “The truly contemporary exhibition should express connective possibilities and make propositions. And, perhaps surprisingly, such an
exhibition should reconnect with the laboratory years of twentieth-century exhibition practice. . . . The
truly contemporary exhibition with its striking quality of unfinishedness and incompleteness would trigger pars pro toto participation” (Obrist, “Battery, Kraftwerk and Laboratory,” in Words of Wisdom: A Curator’s
Vade Mecum on Contemporary Art, ed. Carin Kuoni [New York: Independent Curators International, 2001],
p. 129); in a telesymposium discussing Barbara van der Linden and Hans Ulrich Obrist’s Laboratorium
project (Antwerp, 2000), the curators describe their preference for the word “laboratory” because it is
“neutral” and “still untouched, untouched by science” (“Laboratorium is the answer, what is the question?,” TRANS 8 [2000], p. 114). Laboratory metaphors also arise in artists’ conceptions of their own
exhibitions. For example, Liam Gillick, speaking about his one-man show at the Arnolfini, Bristol,
remarks that it “is a laboratory or workshop situation where there is the opportunity to test out some
ideas in combination, to exercise relational and comparative critical processes” (Gillick quoted in Liam
Gillick: Renovation Filter: Recent Past and Near Future [Bristol: Arnolfini, 2000], p. 16). Rirkrit Tiravanija’s
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Lewis Kachur has described as the “ideological exhibitions” of the historical avantgarde: in these exhibitions (such as the 1920 International Dada Fair and the
1938 International Surrealist Exhibition), the hang sought to reinforce or epitomize the ideas contained within the work.3
The curators promoting this “laboratory” paradigm—including Maria Lind,
Hans Ulrich Obrist, Barbara van der Linden, Hou Hanru, and Nicolas Bourriaud—
have to a large extent been encouraged to adopt this curatorial modus operandi
as a direct reaction to the type of art produced in the 1990s: work that is openended, interact ive, and resist ant to closure, often appear ing to be
“work-in-progress” rather than a completed object. Such work seems to derive
from a creative misreading of poststructuralist theory: rather than the interpretations of a work of art being open to continual reassessment, the work of art itself is
argued to be in perpetual flux. There are many problems with this idea, not least
of which is the difficulty of discerning a work whose identity is willfully unstable.
Another problem is the ease with which the “laboratory” becomes marketable as a
space of leisure and entertainment. Venues such as the Baltic in Gateshead, the
Kunstverein Munich, and the Palais de Tokyo have used met aphor s like
“laboratory,” “construction site”, and “art factory” to differentiate themselves from
bureaucracy-encumbered collection-based museums; their dedicated project
spaces create a buzz of creativity and the aura of being at the vanguard of contemporar y product ion. 4 One could argue that in this context , project-based
works-in-progress and artists-in-residence begin to dovetail with an “experience
economy,” the marketing strategy that seeks to replace goods and services with
scripted and staged personal experiences.5 Yet what the viewer is supposed to garner
from such an “experience” of creativity, which is essentially institutionalized studio
activity, is often unclear.
Related to the project-based “laboratory” tendency is the trend toward inviting contemporary artists to design or troubleshoot amenities within the museum,
work is frequently described in similar terms: it is “like a laboratory for human contact” ( Jerry Saltz,
“Resident Alien,” The Village Voice, July 7–14, 1999, n.p.), or “psycho-social experiments where situations are
made for meetings, exchange, etc.” (Maria Lind, “Letter and Event,” Paletten 223 [April 1995], p. 41). It
should be noted that “laboratory” in this context does not denote psychological or behavioral experiments
on the viewer, but refers instead to creative experimentation with exhibition conventions.
3.
Lewis Kachur, Displaying the Marvelous: Marcel Duchamp, Salvador Dali and the Surrealist Exhibition
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
4.
Under Sune Nordgren, the Baltic in Gateshead had three “AIR” (Artist-in-Residence) spaces for
artists’ studios, but these were only open to the public when the resident artist chose; often the audience had to take the Baltic’s claim to be an “art factory” on trust. The Palais de Tokyo, by contrast, has
up to ten artists in residence at any one time. The Munich Kunstverein, under Maria Lind, sought a
different type of visible productivity: Apolonia Sustersic’s conversion of the gallery entrance featured a
“work console,” where members of the curatorial staff (including Lind) could take turns manning the
gallery’s front desk, continuing their work in public.
5.
B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy: Work Is Theatre and Every Business
a Stage (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999). The Baltic presents itself as “a site for the production, presentation, and experience of contemporary art” through “a heavy emphasis on commissions, invitations to artists, and the work of artists-in-residence” (www.balticmill.com).
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such as the bar ( Jorge Pardo at K21, Düsseldorf; Michael Lin at the Palais de
Tokyo; Liam Gillick at the Whitechapel Art Gallery) or reading lounge (Apolonia
Sustersic at Kunstverein Munich, or the changing “Le Salon” program at the Palais
de Tokyo), and in turn present these as works of art.6 An effect of this insistent
promotion of these ideas of artist-as-designer, function over contemplation, and
open-endedness over aesthetic resolution is often ultimately to enhance the status
of the curator, who gains credit for stage-managing the overall laboratory experience. As Hal Foster warned in the mid-1990s, “the institution may overshadow the
work that it otherwise highlights: it becomes the spectacle, it collects the cultural
capital, and the director-curator becomes the star.”7 It is with this situation in mind
that I focus on the Palais de Tokyo as my starting point for a closer inspection of
some of the claims made for “open-ended,” semifunctional art works, since one of
the Palais’ codirectors, Nicolas Bourriaud, is also their leading theorist.

Relational Aesthetics
Esthétique Rélationnel is the title of Bourriaud’s 1997 collection of essays in
which he attempts to characterize artistic practice of the 1990s. Since there have
been very few attempts to provide an overview of 1990s art, particularly in Britain
where discussion has myopically revolved around the Young British Artists (YBA)
phenomenon, Bourriaud’s book is an important first step in identifying recent
tendencies in contemporary art. It also comes at a time when many academics in
Britain and the U.S. seem reluctant to move on from the politicized agendas and
intellectual battles of 1980s art (indeed, for many, of 1960s art), and condemn
everything from installation art to ironic painting as a depoliticized celebration of
surface, complicitous with consumer spectacle. Bourriaud’s book—written with the
hands-on insight of a curator—promises to redefine the agenda of contemporary
art criticism, since his starting point is that we can no longer approach these works
from behind the “shelter” of sixties art history and its values. Bourriaud seeks to
offer new criteria by which to approach these often rather opaque works of art,
while also claiming that they are no less politicized than their sixties precursors.8
For instance, Bourriaud argues that art of the 1990s takes as its theoretical
horizon “the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the
6.
“Every six months, an artist is invited by the Palais de Tokyo to design and decorate a small space
located under the main staircase but placed at the heart of the exhibition spaces: Le Salon. Both a space of
relaxation and a work of art, Le Salon offers comfortable armchairs, games, reading material, a piano, a
video, or a TV program to those who visit it” (Palais de Tokyo Website [http://www.palaisdetokyo.com],
my translation). The current premises of Portikus Gallery in Frankfurt feature an office, reading room,
and gallery space designed by the artist Tobias Rehberger.
7.
Hal Foster, “The Artist as Ethnographer,” in Foster, The Return of the Real (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1996), p. 198.
8.
“Contemporary art is definitely developing a political project when it endeavors to move into
the relational realm by turning it into an issue” (Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics [Dijon: Les Presses du
Réel, 2002], p. 17). Hereafter cited in the text as RA.
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assertion of an independent and private symbolic space” (RA, p. 14). In other
words, relational art works seek to establish intersubjective encounters (be these
literal or potential) in which meaning is elaborated collectively (RA, p. 18) rather
than in the privatized space of individual consumption. The implication is that
this work inverses the goals of Greenbergian modernism.9 Rather than a discrete,
portable, autonomous work of art that transcends its context, relational art is
ent irely beholden to the cont ingencies of it s environment and audience.
Moreover, this audience is envisaged as a community: rather than a one-to-one
relationship between work of art and viewer, relational art sets up situations in
which viewers are not just addressed as a collective, social entity, but are actually
given the wherewithal to create a community, however temporary or utopian this
may be.
It is important to emphasize, however, that Bourriaud does not regard relational aesthetics to be simply a theory of interactive art. He considers it to be a
means of locating contemporary practice within the culture at large: relational art
is seen as a direct response to the shift from a goods to a service-based economy.10
It is also seen as a response to the virtual relationships of the Internet and globalization, which on the one hand have prompted a desire for more physical and
face-to-face interaction between people, while on the other have inspired artists to
adopt a do-it-yourself (DIY) approach and model their own “possible universes”
(RA, p. 13). This emphasis on immediacy is familiar to us from the 1960s, recalling
the premium placed by performance art on the authenticity of our first-hand
encounter with the artist’s body. But Bourriaud is at pains to distance contemporary work from that of previous generations. The main difference, as he sees it, is
the shift in attitude toward social change: instead of a “utopian” agenda, today’s
artists seek only to find provisional solutions in the here and now; instead of trying to change their environment, artists today are simply “learning to inhabit the
world in a better way”; instead of looking forward to a future utopia, this art sets
up functioning “microtopias” in the present (RA, p. 13). Bourriaud summarizes
this new attitude vividly in one sentence: “It seems more pressing to invent possible relations with our neighbors in the present than to bet on happier tomorrows”
(RA, p. 45). This DIY, microtopian ethos is what Bourriaud perceives to be the
core political significance of relational aesthetics.
Bourriaud names many artists in his book, most of whom are European, and
many of whom were featured in his seminal exhibition Traffic at CAPC Bordeaux

9.
This change in mode of address from “private” to “public” has for some time been associated
with a decisive break with modernism; see Rosalind Krauss, “Sense and Sensibility,” Artforum
(November 1973), pp. 43–53, and “Double Negative: A New Syntax for Sculpture,” in Passages in
Modern Sculpture (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977).
10.
This is reflected in the number of artists whose practice takes the form of offering a “service,”
such as the Berlin-based U.S. artist Christine Hill, who offered back and shoulder massages to exhibition visitors, and who later went on to set up a fully functioning secondhand clothes shop, the
Volksboutique, in Berlin and at Documenta X (1997).
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in 1993. Certain artists are mentioned with metronomic regularity: Liam Gillick,
Rirkrit Tiravanija, Phillippe Parreno, Pierre Huyghe, Carsten Höller, Christine Hill,
Vanessa Beecroft, Maurizio Cattelan, and Jorge Pardo, all of whom will be familiar
to anyone who has attended the international biennials, triennials, and Manifestas
that have proliferated over the last decade. The work of these artists differs from
that of their better known YBA contemporaries in several respects. Unlike the selfcontained (and formally conservative) work of the British, with its accessible
references to mass culture, European work is rather low-impact in appearance,
including photography, video, wall texts, books, objects to be used, and leftovers
from the aftermath of an opening event. It is basically installation art in format, but
this is a term that many of its practitioners would resist; rather than forming a
coherent and distinctive transformation of space (in the manner of Ilya Kabakov’s
“total installation,” a theatrical mise-en-scène), relational art works insist upon use
rather than contemplation.11 And unlike the distinctively branded personalities of
young British art, it is often hard to identify who has made a particular piece of
“relational” art, since it tends to make use of existing cultural forms—including
other works of art—and remixes them in the manner of a DJ or programmer.12
Moreover, many of the artists Bourriaud discusses have collaborated with one
another, further blurring the imprint of individual authorial status. Several have
also curated each others’ work in exhibitions—such as Gillick’s “filtering” of Maria
Lind’s curatorship in What If: Art on the Verge of Architecture and Design (Moderna
Museet, Stockholm, 2000) and Tiravanija’s Utopia Station for the 2003 Venice
Biennale (co-curated with Hans Ulrich Obrist and Molly Nesbit).13 I now wish to
focus on the work of two artists in particular, Tiravanija and Gillick, since
Bourriaud deems them both to be paradigmatic of “relational aesthetics.”
Rirkrit Tiravanija is a New York-based artist, born in Buenos Aires in 1961 to
Thai parents and raised in Thailand, Ethiopia, and Canada. He is best known for

11.
For example, Jorge Pardo’s Pier for Skulptur. Projekte Münster (1997). Pier comprised a 50-meterlong jetty of California redwood with a small pavilion at the end. The work was a functional pier, providing mooring for boats, while a cigarette machine attached to the wall of the pavilion encouraged
people to stop and look at the view.
12.
This strategy is referred to by Bourriaud as “postproduction,” and is elaborated in his follow-up
book to Relational Aesthetics: “Since the early nineties, an ever-increasing number of art works have been
created on the basis of preexisting works; more and more artists interpret, reproduce, reexhibit, or use
works made by others or available cultural products. . . . These artists who insert their own work into
that of others contribute to the eradication of the traditional distinction between production and consumption, creation and copy, readymade and original work. The material they manipulate is no longer
primary.” Bourriaud argues that postproduction differs from the ready-made, which questions authorship and the institution of art, because its emphasis is on recombining existing cultural artifacts in
order to imbue them with new meaning. See Bourriaud, Postproduction (New York: Lukas and
Sternberg, 2002).
13.
The best example of this current obsession with collaboration as a model is found in No Ghost
Just a Shell, an ongoing project by Pierre Huyghe and Philippe Parreno, who have invited Liam Gillick,
Dominique Gonzales-Foerster, M/M, Francois Curlet, Rirkrit Tiravanija, Pierre Joseph, Joe Scanlan,
and others to collaborate with them in creating work around the defunct Japanese manga character
AnnLee.
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hybrid installation performances, in which he cooks vegetable curry or pad thai
for people attending the museum or gallery where he has been invited to work. In
Untitled (Still) (1992) at 303 Gallery, New York, Tiravanija moved everything he
found in the gallery office and storeroom into the main exhibition space, including the director, who was obliged to work in public, among cooking smells and
diners. In the storeroom he set up what was described by one critic as a “makeshift
refugee kitchen,” with paper plates, plastic knives and forks, gas burners, kitchen
utensils, two folding tables, and some folding stools.14 In the gallery he cooked
curries for visitors, and the detritus, utensils, and food packets became the art

Rirkrit Tiravanija. Untitled
(Free). 303 Gallery, New York,
1992. Courtesy Gavin Brown’s
Enterprise, New York.

exhibit whenever the artist wasn’t there. Several critics, and Tiravanija himself,
have observed that this involvement of the audience is the main focus of his
work: the food is but a means to allow a convivial relationship between audience
and artist to develop.15
Underlying much of Tiravanija’s practice is a desire not just to erode the distinction between instititutional and social space, but between artist and viewer;
the phrase “lots of people” regularly appears on his lists of materials. In the late
1990s, Tiravanija focused increasingly on creating situations where the audience
could produce its own work. A more elaborate version of the 303 Gallery installa14.
Jerry Saltz, “A Short History of Rirkrit Tiravanija,” Art in America (February 1996), p. 106.
15.
If one wanted to identify historical precursors for this type of art, there are ample names to cite:
Michael Asher’s untitled installation at the Clare Copley Gallery, Los Angeles, in 1974, in which he
removed the partition between exhibition space and gallery office, or Gordon Matta-Clark’s restaurant
Food, opened with his artist colleagues in the early 1970s. Food was a collective project that enabled artists
to earn a small living and fund their art practice without succumbing to the ideologically compromising
demands of the art market. Other artists who presented the consumption of food and drink as art in the
1960s and early ’70s include Allan Ruppersberg, Tom Marioni, Daniel Spoerri, and the Fluxus group.
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tion/performance was undertaken in Untitled (Tomorrow Is Another Day) (1996) at
the Kölnischer Kunstverein. Here, Tiravanija built a wooden reconstruction of his
New York apartment, which was made open to the public twenty-four hours a day.
People could use the kitchen to make food, wash themselves in his bathroom,
sleep in the bedroom, or hang out and chat in the living room. The catalog
accompanying the Kunstverein project quotes a selection of newspaper articles
and reviews, all of which reiterate the curator’s assertion that “this unique combination of art and life offered an impressive experience of togetherness to
everybody.”16 Although the materials of Tiravanija’s work have become more diverse,

Tiravanija. Untitled
1996 (Tomorrow Is
Another Day).
Kolnischer Kunstverein,
Cologne, Germany, 1996.
Courtesy Gavin Brown’s
Enterprise, New York.

the emphasis remains on use over contemplation. For Pad Thai, a project at De
Appel, Amsterdam, in 1996, he made available a room of amplified electric guitars
and a drumset, allowing visitors to take up the instruments and generate their own
music. Pad Thai initially incorporated a projection of Andy Warhol’s Sleep (1963) and
subsequent incarnations included a film by Marcel Broodthaers at Speaker’s Corner,
Hyde Park, London (in which the artist writes on a blackboard “you are all artists”).
In a project in Glasgow, Cinema Liberté (1999), Tiravanija asked the local audience to
nominate their favorite films, which were then screened outdoors at the intersection
of two streets in Glasgow. As Janet Kraynak has written, although Tiravanija’s
16.
Udo Kittelmann, “Preface,” in Rirkrit Tiravanija: Untitled, 1996 (Tomorrow Is Another Day)
(Cologne: Salon Verlag and Kölnischer Kunstverein, 1996), n.p. As Janet Kraynak has noted,
Tiravanija’s work has occasioned some of the most idealized and euphoric art criticism of recent times:
his work is heralded not just as an emancipatory site, free of constraints, but also as a critique of commodification and as a celebration of cultural identity—to the point where these imperatives ultimately
collapse, in the institutional embrace of Tiravanija’s persona as commodity. See Janet Kraynak,
“Tiravanija’s Liability,” Documents 13 (Fall 1998), pp. 26–40. It is worth quoting Kraynak in full: “While
Tiravanija’s art compels or provokes a host of concerns relevant to the larger domain of contemporary art
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dematerialized projects revive strategies of critique from the 1960s and ’70s, it is
arguable that in the context of today’s dominant economic model of globalization,
Tiravanija’s itinerant ubiquity does not self-reflexively question this logic, but merely
reproduces it.17 He is one of the most established, influential, and omnipresent
figures on the international art circuit, and his work has been crucial to both the
emergence of relational aesthetics as a theory, and to the curatorial desire for “openended,” “laboratory” exhibitions.
My second example is the British artist Liam Gillick, born in 1964. Gillick’s output is interdisciplinary: his heavily theorized interests are disseminated in sculpture,
installation, graphic design, curating, art criticism, and novellas. A prevailing theme
throughout his work in all media is the production of relationships (particularly
social relationships) through our environment. His early work investigated the space
between sculpture and functional design. Examples include his Pinboard Project
(1992), a bulletin board containing instructions for use, potential items for inclusion
on the board, and a recommendation to subscribe to a limited number of specialist
practices, its unique status in the public imagination derives in part from a certain naturalizing of the
critical readings that have accompanied and, to an extent, constructed it. Unlike previous pairings of
avant-garde utopianism, in which art merges happily with life, and anti-institutional criticality, in which
art objects are constituted in, and as, social spaces, what putatively guarantees the production of
uncontaminated social praxis in Tiravanija’s work is the unique imprint of the artist, whose generosity
both animates the installations and unifies them stylistically. A host of articles have focused on the
familial atmosphere of the gallery where he is represented, and other biographical details of his life,
rendering a covert equivalence between Tiravanija’s work and self. This idealized projection seems to
derive from the work itself, as the artist has thematized details of his ethnic background in his installations through references to Thai culture. . . . The artist, repositioned as both the source and arbiter of
meaning, is embraced as the pure embodiment of his/her sexual, cultural, or ethnic identity, guaranteeing both the authenticity and political efficacity of his/her work” (pp. 28–29).
17.
Ibid., pp. 39–40.

Liam Gillick. Pinboard Project (Grey). 1992.
Courtesy the artist and Corvi-Mora, London.

Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics

59

journals; and Prototype Erasmus Table #2 (1994), a table “designed to nearly fill a
room” and conceived as “a working place where it might be possible to finish
working on the book Erasmus Is Late” (Gillick’s publication of 1995), but which is
also available for use by other people “for the storage and exhibition of work on,
under or around it.”18
Since the mid-1990s, Gillick has become best known for his three-dimensional
design work: screens and suspended platforms made of aluminum and colored
Plexiglas, which are often displayed alongside texts and geometrical designs
painted directly onto a wall. Gillick’s descriptions of these works emphasize their
potential use value, but in a way that carefully denies them any specific agency:
each object’s meaning is so overdetermined that it seems to parody both claims
made for modernist design and the language of management consulting. His
120 x 120 cm open-topped Plexiglas cube Discussion Island: Projected Think Tank
(1997) is described as “a work that may be used as an object that might signify an
enclosed zone for the consideration of exchange, information transfer and strategy,” while the Big Conference Centre Legislation Screen (1998), a 3 x 2 meter colored
Plexiglas screen, “helps to define a location where individual actions are limited
by rules imposed by the community as a whole.”19
Gillick’s design structures have been described as constructions having “a
spatial resemblance to office spaces, bus shelters, meeting rooms and canteens,”
but they also take up the legacy of Minimalist sculpture and post-Minimalist
installation art (Donald Judd and Dan Graham immediately come to mind).20 Yet
18.
Gillick, quoted in Liam Gillick, ed. Susanne Gaensheimer and Nicolaus Schaf hausen (Cologne:
Oktagon, 2000), p. 36.
19.
Ibid., pp. 56, 81.
20.
Mike Dawson, “Liam Gillick,” Flux (August–September 2002), p. 63.

Gillick.
Revision/22nd
Floor Wall
Design. 1998.
Courtesy the artist
and Corvi-Mora,
London.
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Gillick’s work differs from that of his art historical predecessors: whereas Judd’s modular boxes made the viewer aware of his/her physical movement around the work,
while also drawing attention to the space in which these were exhibited, Gillick is
happy for viewers to “just stand with their backs to the work and talk to each other.”21
Rather than having the viewer “complete” the work, in the manner of Bruce
Nauman’s corridors or Graham’s video installations of the 1970s, Gillick seeks a
perpetual open-endedness in which his art is a backdrop to activity. “It doesn’t necessarily function best as an object for consideration alone,” he says. “It is sometimes a

Gillick. Big
Conference Centre
Limitation Screen.
1998. Courtesy the
artist and CorviMora, London.

backdrop or decor rather than a pure content provider.”22 Gillick’s titles reflect this
movement away from the directness of 1970s critique in their use of ironically bland
management jargon: Discussion Island, Arrival Rig, Dialogue Platform, Regulation Screen,
Delay Screen, and Twinned Renegotiation Platform.23 These corporate allusions clearly distance the work from that of Graham, who exposed how apparently neutral
architectural materials (such as glass, mirror, and steel) are used by the state and
commerce to exercise political control. For Gillick, the task is not to rail against such
institutions, but to negotiate ways of improving them.24 A word that he frequently
21.
Gillick, Renovation Filter, p. 16.
22.
Gillick, The Wood Way (London: Whitechapel, 2002), p. 84.
23.
All of these works were shown in The Wood Way, an exhibition at Whitechapel Art Gallery in 2002.
24.
However, it is arguable from Gillick’s examples that “improvement” connotes change on just a
formal level. In 1997 he was invited to produce work for a Munich bank and described the project as
follows: “I identified a problematic dead zone in the building—an oversight by the architects—which I
proposed to solve with these screens. These would subtly change the way the space worked.
Interestingly, however, my proposal made the architects rethink that part of the building . . . the architects
came to a better conclusion about how to resolve their designs, without the need for any art” (Gillick,
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uses is “scenario,” and to an extent his entire output is governed by an idea of
“scenario thinking” as a way to envisage change in the world—not as a targeted
critique of the present order, but “to examine the extent to which critical access
is possible at all.”25 It is worth noting that although Gillick’s writing is frustratingly intangible—full of deferral and possibility, rather than the present and
actual—he has been invited to troubleshoot practical projects, such as a traffic
system for Porsche in Stuttgart, and to design intercom systems for a housing project in Brussels. Gillick is typical of his generation in finding no conflict between
this type of work and conventional “white cube” exhibitions; both are seen as
ways to continue his investigation into hypothetical future “scenarios.” Rather
than determining a specific outcome, Gillick is keen to trigger open-ended alternatives to which others may contribute. The middle ground, the compromise, is
what interests him most.
I have chosen to discuss the examples of Gillick and Tiravanija because they
seem to me the clearest expression of Bourriaud’s argument that relational art
privileges intersubjective relations over detached opticality. Tiravanija insists that
the viewer be physically present in a particular situation at a particular time—eating the food that he cooks, alongside other visitors in a communal situation.
Gillick alludes to more hypothetical relations, which in many cases don’t even
need to exist, but he still insists that the presence of an audience is an essential
component of his art: “My work is like the light in the fridge,” he says, “it only
works when there are people there to open the fridge door. Without people, it’s
not art—it’s something else—stuff in a room.”26 This interest in the contingencies
of a “relationship between”—rather than the object itself—is a hallmark of
Gillick’s work and of his interest in collaborative practice as a whole.
This idea of considering the work of art as a potential trigger for participation
is hardly new—think of Happenings, Fluxus instructions, 1970s performance art,
and Joseph Beuys’s declaration that “everyone is an artist.” Each was accompanied
by a rhetoric of democracy and emancipation that is very similar to Bourriaud’s

Renovation Filter, p. 21). One critic has dismissed this mode of working as “corporate feng shui” (Max
Andrews, “Liam Gillick,” Contemporary 32, p. 73), drawing attention to the ways in which the proposed
changes were primarily cosmetic rather than structural. Gillick would reply that the appearance of our
environment conditions our behavior, and so the two are indivisible.
25.
Liam Gillick, “A Guide to Video Conferencing Systems and the Role of the Building Worker in
Relation to the Contemporary Art Exhibition (Backstage),” in Gillick, Five or Six (New York: Lukas and
Sternberg, 2000), p. 9. As Gillick notes, scenario thinking is a tool to propose change, even while it is
“inherently linked to capitalism and the strategizing that goes with it.” This is because it comprises
“one of the key components required in order to maintain the level of mobility and reinvention
required to provide the dynamic aura of so-called free-market economies” (Gillick, “Prevision: Should
the Future Help the Past?,” Five or Six, p. 27).
26.
Gillick in Renovation Filter, p. 16. As Alex Farquharson has noted, “The operative phrase here is
‘might be possible.’ Whereas Rirkrit can reasonably expect his visitors to eat his Thai noodles, it is
unlikely that Liam’s audience will do his reassessing. Instead of real activity, the viewer is offered a fictional role, an approach shared by Gonzalez-Foerster and Parreno” (Alex Farquharson, “Curator and
Artist,” Art Monthly 270 [October 2003], p. 14).
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defense of relational aesthetics.27 The theoretical underpinnings of this desire to
activate the viewer are easy to reel off: Walter Benjamin’s “Author as Producer”
(1934), Roland Barthes’s “Death of the Author” and “birth of the reader” (1968)
and—most important for this context—Umberto Eco’s The Open Work (1962).
Writing on what he perceived to be the open and aleatory character of modernist
literature, music, and art, Eco summarizes his discussion of James Joyce, Luciano
Berio, and Alexander Calder in terms that cannot help but evoke Bourriaud’s
optimism:
The poetics of the “work in movement” (and partly that of the “open”
work) sets in motion a new cycle of relations between the artist and his
audience, a new mechanics of aesthetic perception, a different status
for the artistic product in contemporary society. It opens a new page in
sociology and in pedagogy, as well as a new chapter in the history of
art. It poses new practical problems by organizing new communicative
situations. In short, it installs a new relationship between the contemplation
and the utilization of a work of art.28
Analogies with Tiravanija and Gillick are evident in Eco’s privileging of use value
and the development of “communicative situations.” However, it is Eco’s contention that every work of art is potentially “open,” since it may produce an
unlimited range of possible readings; it is simply the achievement of contemporary art, music, and literature to have foregrounded this fact. 29 Bourriaud
misinterprets these arguments by applying them to a specific type of work (those
that require literal interaction) and thereby redirects the argument back to artistic intentionality rather than issues of reception.30 His position also differs from
Eco in one other important respect: Eco regarded the work of art as a reflection of
the conditions of our existence in a fragmented modern culture, while Bourriaud
sees the work of art producing these conditions. The interactivity of relational art is
therefore superior to optical contemplation of an object, which is assumed to be
passive and disengaged, because the work of art is a “social form” capable of producing positive human relationships. As a consequence, the work is automatically
political in implication and emancipatory in effect.
27.
Beuys is mentioned infrequently in Relational Aesthetics, and on one occasion is specifically
invoked to sever any connection between “social sculpture” and relational aesthetics (p. 30).
28.
Umberto Eco, “The Poetics of the Open Work” (1962), in Eco, The Open Work (Boston: Harvard
University Press, 1989), pp. 22–23.
29.
Eco cites Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perception: “How can anything ever present itself
truly to us since its synthesis is never completed? How could I gain the experience of the world, as I
would of an individual actuating his own existence, since none of the views or perceptions I have of it
can exhaust it and the horizons remain forever open?. . . This ambiguousness does not represent an
imperfection in the nature of existence or in that of consciousness; it is its very definition” (Eco, “The
Poetics of the Open Work,” p. 17).
30.
It could be argued that this approach actually forecloses “open-ended” readings, since the
meaning of the work becomes so synonymous with the fact that its meaning is open.
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Aesthetic Judgment
To anyone acquainted with Althusser’s 1969 essay “Ideology and Ideological
State Apparatuses,” this description of social forms producing human relationships
will sound familiar. Bourriaud’s defense of relational aesthetics is indebted to
Althusser’s idea that culture—as an “ideological state apparatus”—does not reflect
society, but produces it. As taken up by feminist artists and film critics in the 1970s,
Althusser’s essay permitted a more nuanced expression of the political in art. As
Lucy Lippard has noted, it was in form (rather than content) that much art of the
late 1960s aspired to a democratic outreach; the insight of Althusser’s essay heralded
recognition that a critique of institutions by circumventing them had to be
refined.31 It was not enough to show that art work’s meaning is subordinate to its
framing (be this in a museum or magazine); the viewer’s own identification with
the image was deemed to be equally important. Rosalyn Deutsche usefully summarizes this shift in her book Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics (1996) when she
compares Hans Haacke to the subsequent generation of artists that included
Cindy Sherman, Barbara Kruger, and Sherrie Levine. Haacke’s work, she writes,
“invited viewers to decipher relations and find content already inscribed in images
but did not ask them to examine their own role and investments in producing
images.”32 By contrast, the subsequent generation of artists “treated the image itself
as a social relationship and the viewer as a subject constructed by the very object
from which it formerly claimed detachment.”33
I will return later to the question of identification that Deutsche raises. In
the meantime it is necessary to observe that it is only a short step from regarding
the image as a social relationship to Bourriaud’s argument that the structure of an
art work produces a social relationship. However, identifying what the structure of
a relational art work is is no easy task, precisely because the work claims to be
open-ended. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that relational art works are
an outgrowth of installation art, a form that has from its inception solicited the
literal presence of the viewer. Unlike the “Public Vision” generation of artists,
whose achievements—largely in photography—have been unproblematically
assimilated into art-historical orthodoxy, installation art has been frequently denigrated as just one more form of postmodern spectacle. For some critics, notably
Rosalind Krauss, installation art’s use of diverse media divorces it from a mediumspecific tradition; it therefore has no inherent conventions against which it may
self-reflexively operate, nor criteria against which we may evaluate its success.
Without a sense of what the medium of installation art is, the work cannot attain
31.
I am thinking here of much Conceptual art, video, performance, installation, and site-specific
work that expressed its politics by refusing to gratify or collude with the art market, but which
remained self-referential on the level of content. See Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization of the
Art Object 1966–1972 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. vii–xxii.
32.
Rosalyn Deutsche, Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp.
295–96. Italics mine.
33.
Ibid., p. 296.

64

OCTOBER

the holy grail of self-reflexive criticality.34 I have suggested elsewhere that the viewer’s
presence might be one way to envisage the medium of installation art, but Bourriaud
complicates this assertion.35 He argues that the criteria we should use to evaluate
open-ended, participatory art works are not just aesthetic, but political and even ethical: we must judge the “relations” that are produced by relational art works.
When confronted by a relational art work, Bourriaud suggests that we ask
the following questions: “does this work permit me to enter into dialogue? Could I
exist, and how, in the space it defines?” (RA, p. 109). He refers to these questions,
which we should ask in front of any aesthetic product, as “criteria of co-existence”
(RA, p. 109). Theoretically, in front of any work of art, we can ask what kind of
social model the piece produces; could I live, for instance, in a world structured by
the organizing principles of a Mondrian painting? Or, what “social form” is produced
by a Surrealist object? The problem that arises with Bourriaud’s notion of “structure” is that it has an erratic relationship to the work’s ostensible subject matter, or
content. For example, do we value the fact that Surrealist objects recycle outmoded
commodities—or the fact that their imagery and disconcerting juxtapositions
explore the unconscious desires and anxieties of their makers? With the hybrid
installation/performances of relational aesthetics, which rely so heavily on context and the viewer’s literal engagement, these questions are even more difficult
to answer. For example, what Tiravanija cooks, how and for whom, are less important to Bourriaud than the fact that he gives away the results of his cooking for
free. Gillick’s bulletin boards can be similarly questioned: Bourriaud does not discuss the texts or images referred to on the individual clippings pinned to the
boards, nor the formal arrangement and juxtaposition of these clippings, but only
Gillick’s democratization of material and flexible format. (The owner is at liberty
to modify these various elements at any given time according to personal tastes
and current events.) For Bourriaud, the structure is the subject matter—and in
this he is far more formalist than he acknowledges.36 Unhinged both from artistic
intentionality and consideration of the broader context in which they operate,
relational art works become, like Gillick’s pinboards, just “a constantly changing
34.
Rosalind Krauss, A Voyage on the North Sea (London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), p. 56. Elsewhere,
Krauss suggests that after the late 1960s, it was to a “conceptual-cum-architectural site that art practice
would become ‘specific,’ rather than to any aesthetic medium”—as best exemplified in the work of
Marcel Broodthaers (Krauss, “Performing Art,” London Review of Books, November 12, 1998, p. 18). While I
agree to an extent with Krauss on the point of self-reflexive criticality, I am troubled by her reluctance to
countenance other ways in which contemporary installation art might successfully operate.
35.
See the conclusion to my forthcoming book, Installation Art and the Viewer (London: Tate
Publishing, 2005).
36.
This is reflected in Bourriaud’s discussion of Felix Gonzales-Torres, an artist whose work he considers to be a crucial forerunner of relational aesthetics. Before his death from AIDS in 1996, GonzalesTorres gained recognition for his emotive reworkings of Minimalist sculpture using piles of sweets and
stacks of paper, to which visitors are encouraged to help themselves. Through this work, Gonzales-Torres
made subtle allusions to politically charged issues such as the AIDS crisis (a pile of sweets matched the
weight of his partner Ross, who died in 1991), urban violence (handgun laws in Untitled [NRA] [1991]),
and homosexuality (Perfect Lovers [1991]). Bourriaud, however, demotes this aspect of Gonzales-Torres’s
practice in favor of its “structure”—its literal generosity toward the viewer.
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portrait of the heterogeneity of everyday life,” and do not examine their relationship to it.37 In other words, although the works claim to defer to their context,
they do not question their imbrication within it. Gillick’s pinboards are embraced
as democratic in structure—but only those who own them may interact with their
arrangement. We need to ask, as Group Material did in the 1980s, “Who is the
public? How is a culture made, and who is it for?”
I am not suggesting that relational art works need to develop a greater social
conscience—by making pinboard works about international terrorism, for example, or giving free curries to refugees. I am simply wondering how we decide what
the “structure” of a relational art work comprises, and whether this is so detachable from the work’s ostensible subject matter or permeable with its context.
Bourriaud wants to equate aesthetic judgment with an ethicopolitical judgment of
the relationships produced by a work of art. But how do we measure or compare
these relationships? The quality of the relationships in “relational aesthetics” are
never examined or called into question. When Bourriaud argues that “encounters
are more important than the individuals who compose them,” I sense that this
question is (for him) unnecessary; all relations that permit “dialogue” are automat ically assumed to be democrat ic and therefore good. But what does
“democracy” really mean in this context? If relational art produces human relations, then the next logical question to ask is what types of relations are being
produced, for whom, and why?

Antagonism
Rosalyn Deutsche has argued that the public sphere remains democratic
only insofar as its naturalized exclusions are taken into account and made open to
contestation: “Conflict, division, and instability, then, do not ruin the democratic
public sphere; they are conditions of its existence.” Deutsche takes her lead from
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics. Published in 1985, Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony is one
of the first books to reconsider Leftist political theory through the lens of poststructuralism, following what the authors perceived to be an impasse of Marxist
theorization in the 1970s. Their text is a rereading of Marx through Gramsci’s theor y of hegemony and Lacan’s under st anding of subject ivit y as split and
decentered. Several of the ideas that Laclau and Mouffe put forward allow us to
reconsider Bourriaud’s claims for the politics of relational aesthetics in a more
critical light.
The first of these ideas is the concept of antagonism. Laclau and Mouffe
argue that a fully functioning democratic society is not one in which all antagonisms have disappeared, but one in which new political frontiers are constantly
37.

Eric Troncy, “London Calling,” Flash Art (Summer 1992), p. 89.
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being drawn and brought into debate—in other words, a democratic society is
one in which relations of conflict are sustained, not erased. Without antagonism
there is only the imposed consensus of authoritarian order—a total suppression
of debate and discussion, which is inimical to democracy. It is important to stress
right away that the idea of antagonism is not understood by Laclau and Mouffe to
be a pessimistic acceptance of political deadlock; antagonism does not signal “the
expulsion of utopia from the field of the political.” On the contrary, they maintain
that without the concept of utopia there is no possibility of a radical imaginary.
The task is to balance the tension between imaginary ideal and pragmatic management of a social positivity without lapsing into the totalitarian.
This understanding of antagonism is grounded in Laclau and Mouffe’s
theory of subjectivity. Following Lacan, they argue that subjectivity is not a selftransparent, rational, and pure presence, but is irremediably decentered and
incomplete.38 However, surely there is a conflict between a concept of the subject
as decentered and the idea of political agency? “Decentering” implies the lack of a
unified subject, while “agency” implies a fully present, autonomous subject of
political will and self-determination. Laclau argues that this conflict is false,
because the subject is neither entirely decentered (which would imply psychosis)
nor entirely unified (i.e., the absolute subject). Following Lacan, he argues that we
have a failed structural identity, and are therefore dependent on identification in
order to proceed.39 Because subjectivity is this process of identification, we are
necessarily incomplete entities. Antagonism, therefore, is the relationship that
emerges between such incomplete entities. Laclau contrasts this to the relationships that emerge between complete entities, such as contradiction (A-not A) or
“real difference” (A-B). We all hold mutually contradictory beliefs (for example,
there are mater ialist s who read horoscopes and psychoanalyst s who send
Christmas cards) but this does not result in antagonism. Nor is “real difference”
(A-B) equal to antagonism; because it concerns full identities, it results in collision—like a car crash or “the war against terrorism.” In the case of antagonism,
argue Laclau and Mouffe, “we are confronted with a different situation: the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not
from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution.’’40 In other
words, the presence of what is not me renders my identity precarious and vulnerable, and the threat that the other represents transforms my own sense of self into
something questionable. When played out on a social level, antagonism can be
38.
For Lacan, the subject is not equivalent to a conscious sense of agency: “Lacan’s ‘subject’ is the
subject of the unconscious . . . inescapably divided, castrated, split” as a result of his/her entry into language (Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis [London: Routledge,
1996], pp. 195–96).
39.
“ . . . the subject is partially self-determined. However, as this self-determination is not the expression of what the subject already is but the result of its lack of being instead, self-determination can only
proceed through processes of identification” (Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time
(1990), quoted in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe [London: Routledge, 1996], p. 55).
40.
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), p. 125.
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viewed as the limits of society’s ability to fully constitute itself. Whatever is at the
boundary of the social (and of identity), seeking to define it also destroys its ambition to constitute a full presence: “As conditions of possibility for the existence of
a pluralist democracy, conflicts and antagonisms constitute at the same time the
condition of impossibility of its final achievement.”41
I dwell on this theory in order to suggest that the relations set up by relational aesthetics are not intrinsically democratic, as Bourriaud suggests, since they
rest too comfortably within an ideal of subjectivity as whole and of community as
immanent togetherness. There is debate and dialogue in a Tiravanija cooking
piece, to be sure, but there is no inherent friction since the situation is what
Bourriaud calls “microtopian”: it produces a community whose members identify
with each other, because they have something in common. The only substantial
account that I can find of Tiravanija’s first solo exhibition at 303 Gallery is by Jerry
Saltz in Art in America, and it runs as follows:
At 303 Gallery I regularly sat with or was joined by a stranger, and it was
nice. The gallery became a place for sharing, jocularity and frank talk.
I had an amazing run of meals with art dealers. Once I ate with Paula
Cooper who recounted a long, complicated bit of professional gossip.
Another day, Lisa Spellman related in hilarious detail a story of
intrigue about a fellow dealer trying, unsuccessfully, to woo one of her
artists. About a week later I ate with David Zwirner. I bumped into him
on the street, and he said, “nothing’s going right today, let’s go to
Rirkrit’s.” We did, and he talked about a lack of excitement in the New
York art world. Another time I ate with Gavin Brown, the artist and
dealer . . . who talked about the collapse of SoHo—only he welcomed it,
felt it was about time, that the galleries had been showing too much
mediocre art. Later in the show’s run, I was joined by an unidentified
woman and a curious flirtation filled the air. Another time I chatted
with a young artist who lived in Brooklyn who had real insights about
the shows he’d just seen.42
The informal chattiness of this account clearly indicates what kind of problems
face those who wish to know more about such work: the review only tells us that
Tiravanija’s intervention is considered good because it permits networking among
a group of art dealers and like-minded art lovers, and because it evokes the atmosphere of a late-night bar. Everyone has a common interest in art, and the result is
art-world gossip, exhibition reviews, and flirtation. Such communication is fine
to an extent , but it is not in and of it self emblemat ic of “democracy.”
To be fair, I think that Bourriaud recognizes this problem—but he does not raise
it in relation to the artists he promotes: “Connecting people, creating interactive,
41.
42.

Mouffe, “Introduction,” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, p. 11.
Saltz, “A Short History of Rirkrit Tiravanija,” p. 107.
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communicative experience,” he says, “What for? If you forget the ‘what for?’ I’m
afraid you’re left with simple Nokia art—producing interpersonal relations for
their own sake and never addressing their political aspects.”43 I would argue that
Tiravanija’s art, at least as presented by Bourriaud, falls short of addressing the
political aspect of communication—even while certain of his projects do at first
glance appear to address it in a dissonant fashion. Let us return to accounts of
Tiravanija’s Cologne project, Untitled (Tomorrow Is Another Day). I have already
quoted curator Udo Kittelman’s comment that the installation offered “an impressive experience of togetherness to everybody.” He continues: “Groups of people
prepared meals and talked, took a bath or occupied the bed. Our fear that the artliving-space might be vandalized did not come true. . . . The art space lost its
institutional function and finally turned into a free social space.”44 The Kölnischer
Stadt-Anzeiger concurred that the work offered “a kind of ‘asylum’ for everyone.”45
But who is the “everyone” here? This may be a microtopia, but—like utopia—it is
still predicated on the exclusion of those who hinder or prevent its realization. (It
is tempting to consider what might have happened if Tiravanija’s space had been
invaded by those seeking genuine “asylum.”)46 His installations reflect Bourriaud’s
understanding of the relations produced by relational art works as fundamentally
harmonious, because they are addressed to a community of viewing subjects with
something in common.47 This is why Tiravanija’s works are political only in the loosest sense of advocating dialogue over monologue (the one-way communication
equated with spectacle by the Situationists). The content of this dialogue is not in
itself democratic, since all questions return to the hackneyed nonissue of “is it
art?”48 Despite Tiravanija’s rhetoric of open-endedness and viewer emancipation,
43.
Bourriaud quoted in “Public Relations: Bennett Simpson Talks with Nicolas Bourriaud,” p. 48.
44.
Udo Kittelmann, “Preface,” in Rirkrit Tiravanija, n.p.
45.
Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger quoted in Rirkrit Tiravanija, n.p.
46.
Saltz muses on this question in a wonderfully blinkered fashion: “ . . . theoretically anyone can
come in [to an art gallery]. How come they don’t? Somehow the art world seems to secrete an invisible
enzyme that repels outsiders. What would happen if the next time Tiravanija set up a kitchen in an art
gallery, a bunch of homeless people turned up daily for lunch? What would the Walker Art Center do if
a certain homeless man scraped up the price of admission to the museum, and chose to sleep on
Tiravanija’s cot all day, every day? . . . In his own quiet way, Tiravanija forces these questions to the forefront, and jimmies the lock (so efficiently left bolted by much so-called political art) on the door that
separates the art world from everything else.” The “invisible enzyme” that Saltz refers to should alert
him precisely to the limitations of Tiravanija’s work and its nonantagonistic approach to issues of public space (Saltz, “A Short History of Rirkrit Tiravanija,” p. 106).
47.
Jean-Luc Nancy’s critique of the Marxist idea of community as communion in The Inoperative
Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) has been crucial to my consideration of
a counter-model to relational aesthetics. Since the mid-1990s, Nancy’s text has become an increasingly
important reference point for writers on contemporary art, as seen in Rosalyn Deutsche, Evictions;
chapter 4 of Pamela M. Lee’s Object to Be Destroyed: The Work of Gordon Matta-Clark (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2000); George Baker, “Relations and Counter-Relations: An Open Letter to Nicolas
Bourriaud,” in Zusammenhänge herstellen/Contextualise, ed. Yilmaz Dziewior (Cologne: Dumont, 2002);
and Jessica Morgan, Common Wealth (London: Tate Publishing, 2003).
48.
As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported, “No subject is given, yet the artistic context automatically leads all discussions back to the question about the function of art.” Christophe Blase,
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the structure of his work circumscribes the outcome in advance, and relies on its
presence within a gallery to differentiate it from entertainment. Tiravanija’s
microtopia gives up on the idea of transformation in public culture and reduces
its scope to the pleasures of a private group who identify with one another as
gallery-goers.49
Gillick’s position on the question of dialogue and democracy is more ambiguous. At first glance he appears to support Laclau and Mouffe’s antagonism thesis:
While I admire artists who construct “better” visions of how things
might be, the middle-ground, negotiated territories I am interested in
always carry the possibility of moments where idealism is unclear.
There are as many demonstrations of compromise, strategy, and collapse in my work as there are clear recipes for how our environment
can be better.50
However, when one looks for “clear recipes” in Gillick’s work, few if any are to be
found. “I’m working in a nebulous cloud of ideas,” he says, “which are somewhat
partial or parallel rather than didactic.”51 Unwilling to state what ideals are to be
compromised, Gillick trades on the credibility of referencing architecture (its
engagement with concrete social situations) while remaining abstract on the issue
of articulating a specific position. The Discussion Platforms, for example, do not
point to any particular change, just change in general—a “scenario” in which
potential “narratives” may or may not emerge. Gillick’s position is slippery, and
ultimately he seems to argue for compromise and negotiation as recipes for
improvement. Logically, this pragmatism is tantamount to an abandonment or
failure of ideals; his work is the demonstration of a compromise, rather than an
articulation of a problem.52
By contrast, Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of democracy as antagonism can be
seen in the work of two artists conspicuously ignored by Bourriaud in Relational
Aesthetics and Postproduction: the Swiss artist Thomas Hirschhorn and the Spanish
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 19, 1996, quoted in Rirkrit Tiravanija, n.p. He continues:
“Whether this discourse is read on a naïve or a context-educated level—the intermediate level would
be the obligatory reference to Duchamp—is a matter of chance and depends on the respective participants. Anyway, the fact that communication in general and a discussion on art in particular takes
place, gains a positive value as smallest denominator.”
49.
Essentially, there is no difference between utopia (societal perfection) and the microtopia,
which is just personal perfection to the power of ten (or twenty, or however many participants are
present). Both are predicated on exclusion of that which hinders or threatens the harmonious order.
This is seen throughout Thomas More’s description of Utopia. Describing a troublesome Christian
zealot who condemned other religions, the traveler Raphael recounts: “When he’d been going on like
this for some time, he was arrested and charged, not with blasphemy, but with disturbance of the
peace. He was duly convicted and sentenced to exile—for one of the most ancient principles of their
constitution is religious toleration” (Thomas More, Utopia [London: Penguin Books, 1965], p. 119).
50.
Gillick, The Wood Way, pp. 81–82.
51.
Gillick, Renovation Filter, p. 20.
52.
We could even say that in Gillick’s microtopia, devotion to compromise is the ideal: an intriguing
but untenable hypothesis, and ultimately less a democratic microtopia than a form of “third way” politics.

70

OCTOBER

artist Santiago Sierra.53 These artists set up “relationships” that emphasize the
role of dialogue and negotiation in their art, but do so without collapsing these
relationships into the work’s content. The relations produced by their performances and installations are marked by sensations of unease and discomfort
rather than belonging, because the work acknowledges the impossibility of a “microtopia” and instead sustains a tension among viewers, participants, and context. An
integral part of this tension is the introduction of collaborators from diverse economic backgrounds, which in turn serves to challenge contemporary art’s
self-perception as a domain that embraces other social and political structures.

Nonidentification and Autonomy
The work of Santiago Sierra (born in 1966), like that of Tiravanija, involves
the literal setting-up of relations among people: the artist, the participants in his
work, and the audience. But since the late 1990s Sierra’s “actions” have been organized around relations that are more complicated—and more controversial—than
those produced by the artists associated with relational aesthetics. Sierra has
attracted tabloid attention and belligerent criticism for some of his more extreme
actions, such as 160 cm Line Tattooed on Four People (2000), A Person Paid for 360
Continuous Working Hours (2000), and Ten People Paid to Masturbate (2000). These
ephemeral actions are documented in casual black-and-white photographs, a short
text, and occasionally video. This mode of documentation appears to be a legacy of
1970s Conceptual and body art—Chris Burden and Marina Abramovic spring to
mind—but Sierra’s work significantly develops this tradition in its use of other people as performers and in the emphasis on their remuneration. While Tiravanija
celebrates the gift, Sierra knows that there’s no such thing as a free meal: everything and everyone has a price. His work can be seen as a grim meditation on the
social and political conditions that permit disparities in people’s “prices” to
emerge. Now regularly commissioned to make work in galleries throughout
Europe and the Americas, Sierra creates a kind of ethnographic realism, in which
the outcome or unfolding of his action forms an indexical trace of the economic
and social reality of the place in which he works.54
53.
However, Hirschhorn was included in the exhibition GNS and Sierra in Hardcore, both held at
the Palais de Tokyo in 2003. See also Bourriaud’s discussion of Sierra in “Est-il bon? Est-il méchant?,”
Beaux Arts 228 (May 2003), p. 41.
54.
Since Sierra moved to Mexico in 1996, the majority of his actions have taken place in Latin
America, and the “realism” of their outcome is usually a savage indictment of globalization—but this is not
always the case. In Elevation of Six Benches (2001) at the Kunsthalle in Munich, Sierra paid workers to hold
up all the leather benches in the museum galleries for set periods of time. The project was a compromise,
since the Kunsthalle would not let Sierra tear out a wall of their new Herzog & de Meuron gallery for workers to hold up, but Sierra still considered the outcome to be successful “since it reflected the reality of
labor relations in Munich. Munich is a clean and prosperous city, and consequently the only people we
could find to perform the task at hand were unemployed actors and bodybuilders who wanted to show off
their physical prowess” (Sierra, “A Thousand Words,” Artforum [October 2002], p. 131).
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Santiago Sierra. Left: 250 cm Line Tatooed on Six Paid People.
Espacio Aglutinador, Havana, December 1999. Right: Workers Who
Cannot Be Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes.
Kunst-Werke Berlin, September 2000. Courtesy Lisson Gallery and the artist.

Interpreting Sierra’s practice in this way runs counter to dominant readings
of his work, which present it as a nihilistic reflection on Marx’s theory of the
exchange value of labor. (Marx argued that the worker’s labor time is worth less to
the capitalist than its subsequent exchange value in the form of a commodity
produced by this labor.) The tasks that Sierra requires of his collaborators—which
are invariably useless, physically demanding, and on occasion leave permanent
scars—are seen as amplifications of the status quo in order to expose its ready
abuse of those who will do even the most humiliating or pointless job in return for
money. Because Sierra receives payment for his actions—as an artist—and is the
first to admit the contradictions of his situation, his detractors argue that he is
stating the pessimistic obvious: capitalism exploits. Moreover, this is a system from
which nobody is exempt. Sierra pays others to do work for which he gets paid, and
in turn he is exploited by galleries, dealers, and collectors. Sierra himself does little
to contradict this view when he opines,
I can’t change anything. There is no possibility that we can change anything with our artistic work. We do our work because we are making
art, and because we believe art should be something, something that
follows reality. But I don’t believe in the possibility of change.55
Sierra’s apparent complicity with the status quo does raise the question of how his
work differs from that of Tiravanija. It is worth bearing in mind that, since the
1970s, older avant-garde rhetorics of opposition and transformation have been
frequently replaced by strategies of complicity; what matters is not the complicity,
but how we receive it. If Tiravanija’s work is experienced in a major key, then
Sierra’s is most definitely minor. What follows is an attempt to read the latter’s
55.
Sierra, quoted in Santiago Sierra: Works 2002–1990 (Birmingham, England: Ikon Gallery,
2002), p. 15.
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work through the dual lenses of Relational Aesthetics and Hegemony in order to tease
out these differences further.
It has already been noted that Sierra documents his actions and thereby
ensures that we know what he considers their “structure” to be. Take, for example,
The Wall of a Gallery Pulled Out, Inclined Sixty Degrees from the Ground and Sustained by
Five People, Mexico City (2000). Unlike Tiravanija and Gillick, who embrace an idea of
open-endedness, Sierra delimits from the outset his choice of invited participants
and the context in which the event takes place. “Context” is a key word for Gillick
and Tiravanija, yet their work does little to address the problem of what a context
actually comprises. (One has the impression that it exists as undifferentiated infinity,
like cyberspace.) Laclau and Mouffe argue that for a context to be constituted and
identified as such, it must demarcate certain limits; it is from the exclusions engendered by this demarcation that antagonism occurs. It is precisely this act of exclusion
that is disavowed in relational art’s preference for “open-endedness.”56 Sierra’s
actions, by contrast, embed themselves into other “institutions” (e.g., immigration,
the minimum wage, traffic congestion, illegal street commerce, homelessness) in
order to highlight the divisions enforced by these contexts. Crucially, however, Sierra
neither presents these divisions as reconciled (in the way Tiravanija elides the
museum with the café or apartment), nor as entirely separate spheres: the fact that
his works are realized moves them into the terrain of antagonism (rather than the
“car crash” model of collision between full identities) and hints that their boundaries
are both unstable and open to change.
56.
As Laclau argues, it is this “radical undecidability,” and the decision that has to be taken within this,
that is constitutive of a political society. See Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 52–53.

Sierra. Persons Paid to Have Their Hair
Dyed Blond. Arsenale, Venice Biennale, 2001.
Courtesy Lisson Gallery and the artist.
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In a work for the 2001 Venice Biennale, Persons Paid to Have Their Hair Dyed
Blond, Sierra invited illegal street vendors, most of whom came from southern
Italy or were immigrants from Senegal, China, and Bangladesh, to have their
hair dyed blond in return for 120,000 lire ($60). The only condition to their participation was that their hair be naturally dark. Sierra’s description of the work
does not document the impact of his action on the days that followed the mass
bleaching, but this aftermath was an integral aspect of the work.57 During the
Venice Biennale, the street vendors—who hover on street corners selling fake
designer handbags—are usually the social group most obviously excluded from
the glitzy opening; in 2001, however, their newly bleached hair literally highlighted their presence in the city. This was coupled by a gesture inside the
Biennale proper, where Sierra gave over his allocated exhibition space in the
Arsenale to a handful of the vendors, who used it to sell their fake Fendi handbags on a groundsheet, just as they did on the street. Sierra’s gesture prompted
a wry analogy between art and commerce, in the style of 1970s institutional critique, but moved substantially beyond this, since vendors and exhibition were
mutually estranged by the confront at ion. Instead of aggressively hailing
passersby with their trade, as they did on the street, the vendors were subdued.
This made my own encounter with them disarming in a way that only subsequent ly revealed to me my own anxiet ies about feeling “included” in the
Biennale. Surely these guys were actors? Had they crept in here for a joke?
Foregrounding a moment of mutual nonidentification, Sierra’s action disrupted
the art audience’s sense of identity, which is founded precisely on unspoken
racial and class exclusions, as well as veiling blatant commerce. It is important
that Sierra’s work did not achieve a harmonious reconciliation between the two
systems, but sustained the tension between them.
Sierra’s return to the Venice Biennale in 2003 comprised a major performance/installation for the Spanish pavilion. Wall Enclosing a Space involved sealing
off the pavilion’s interior with concrete blocks from floor to ceiling. On entering
the building, viewers were confronted by a hastily constructed yet impregnable
wall that rendered the galleries inaccessible. Visitors carrying a Spanish passport
were invited to enter the space via the back of the building, where two immigration officers were inspecting passports. All non-Spanish nationals, however, were
denied entry to the pavilion, whose interior contained nothing but gray paint
peeling from the walls, left over from the previous year’s exhibition. The work was
“relational” in Bourriaud’s sense, but it problematized any idea of these relations
57.
“The procedure was done in a collective manner inside the closed doors of a warehouse situated
in the Arsenale, during the inauguration of that year’s Venice Biennale. Although the number of people
programmed to take part in this operation was originally 200, it was finally down to 133 due to the
increasing arrival of immigrants, making it difficult to calculate with precision how many had already
entered the hall. It was then decided to shut down the entrance and calculate the number by a rough
count. This caused numerous problems at the door, due to the never-ending flow of people that left or
entered” (Sierra, quoted in Santiago Sierra, p. 46).
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Sierra. Wall Enclosing a Space. Spanish Pavilion, Venice
Biennale, 2003. Left photo: Pablo Leon de la Barra.
Right photo: Charles LaBelle.

being fluid and unconstrained by exposing how all our interactions are, like public space, riven with social and legal exclusions.58
The work of Thomas Hirschhorn (born in 1957) often addresses similar
issues. His practice is conventionally read in terms of its contribution to sculptural
tradition—his work is said to reinvent the monument, the pavilion, and the altar
by immersing the viewer among found images, videos, and photocopies, bound
together in cheap, perishable materials such as cardboard, brown tape, and tinfoil. Beyond occasional references to the tendency of his work to get vandalized or
looted when situated outside the gallery, the role of the viewer is rarely addressed
in writing on his art.59 Hirschhorn is well-known for his assertion that he does not
make political art, but makes art politically. Significantly, this political commitment does not take the form of literally activating the viewer in a space:
I do not want to invite or oblige viewers to become interactive with
what I do; I do not want to activate the public. I want to give of myself,
to engage myself to such a degree that viewers confronted with the
work can take part and become involved, but not as actors.60
Hirschhorn’s work represents an important shift in the way that contemporary art
conceives of its viewer, one that is matched by his assertion of art’s autonomy. One
58.
As Laclau and Mouffe conclude, politics should not found itself on postulating an “essence of
the social” but, on the contrary, on affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of every “essence”
and on the constitutive character of social division and antagonism. See Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony,
p. 193.
59.
The most substantial example of this approach is Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Cargo and Cult:
The Displays of Thomas Hirschhorn,” Artforum (November 2001). The peripheral location of
Hirschhorn’s sculptures has on occasion meant that their contents have been stolen, most notably in
Glasgow, 2000, before the exhibition had even opened.
60.
Hirschhorn, interview with Okwui Enwezor, in Thomas Hirschhorn: Jumbo Spoons and Big Cake
(Chicago: Art Institute of Chicago, 2000), p. 27.
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of the presumptions underlying Relational Aesthetics is the idea—introduced by the
historical avant-garde and reiterated ever since—that art should not be a privileged and independent sphere but instead fused with “life.” Today, when art has
become all too subsumed into everyday life—as leisure, entertainment, and business—artists such as Hirschhorn are reasserting the autonomy of artistic activity.
As a consequence, Hirschhorn does not regard his work to be “open-ended” or to
require completion by the viewer, since the politics of his practice derive instead
from how the work is made:
To make art politically means to choose materials that do not intimidate, a format that doesn’t dominate, a device that does not seduce. To
make art politically is not to submit to an ideology or to denounce the
system, in opposition to so-called “political art.” It is to work with the
fullest energy against the principle of “quality.”61
A rhetoric of democracy pervades Hirschhorn’s work, but it is not manifested in
the viewer’s literal activation; rather, it appears in decisions regarding format,
materials, and location, such as his “altars,” which emulate ad hoc memorials of
flowers and toys at accident sites, and which are located in peripheral locations
around a city. In these works—as in the installations Pole-Self and Laundrette, both
2001—found images, texts, advertisements, and photocopies are juxtaposed to
contextualize consumer banality with political and military atrocities.
Many of Hirschhorn’s concerns came together in the Bataille Monument
(2002), made for Documenta XI. Located in Nordstadt, a suburb of Kassel several
miles away from the main Documenta venues, the Monument comprised three installations in large makeshift shacks, a bar run by a local family, and a sculpture of a
tree, all erected on a lawn surrounded by two housing projects. The shacks were
constructed from Hirschhorn’s signature materials: cheap timber, foil, plastic
sheeting, and brown tape. The first housed a library of books and videos grouped
around five Bataillean themes: word, image, art, sex, and sport. Several worn sofas,
a television, and video were also provided, and the whole installation was designed
to facilitate familiarization with the philosopher, of whom Hirschhorn claims to
be a “fan.” The two other shacks housed a television studio and an installation of
information about Bataille’s life and work. To reach the Bataille Monument, visitors
had to participate in a further aspect of the work: securing a lift from a Turkish
cab company which was contracted to ferry Documenta visitors to and from the site.
Viewers were then stranded at the Monument until a return cab became available,
during which time they would inevitably make use of the bar.
In locating the Monument in the middle of a community whose ethnic and economic status did not mark it as a target audience for Documenta, Hirschhorn
61.
Ibid., p. 29. Hirschhorn is here referring to the idea of quality espoused by Clement Greenberg,
Michael Fried, and other critics as a criterion of aesthetic judgment. I should like to distance my use of
“quality” (as in “the quality of the relationships in relational aesthetics”) from that alluded to by
Hirschhorn.
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Thomas Hirschhorn. Right
and facing page: Bataille
Monument, Documenta
XI, 2002. Courtesy Barbara
Gladstone Gallery, New York.

contrived a curious rapprochement between the influx of art tourists and the area’s
residents. Rather than make the local populace subject to what he calls the “zoo
effect,” Hirschhorn’s project made visitors feel like hapless intruders. Even more disruptively, in light of the international art world’s intellectual pretensions,
Hirschhorn’s Monument took the local inhabitants seriously as potential Bataille readers. This gesture induced a range of emotive responses among visitors, including
accusations that Hirschhorn’s gesture was inappropriate and patronizing. This unease
revealed the fragile conditioning of the art world’s self-constructed identity. The
complicated play of identificatory and dis-identificatory mechanisms at work in the
content, construction, and location of the Bataille Monument were radically and
disruptively thought-provoking: the “zoo effect” worked two ways. Rather than offering, as the Documenta handbook claims, a reflection on “communal commitment,” the
Bataille Monument served to destabilize (and therefore potentially liberate) any notion
of community identity or what it might mean to be a “fan” of art and philosophy.
A work like the Bataille Monument depends on its context for impact, but it
could theoret ically be rest aged elsewhere, in comparable circumst ances.
Significantly, the viewer is no longer required to participate literally (i.e., to eat
noodles, or to activate a sculpture), but is asked only to be a thoughtful and
reflective visitor:
I do not want to do an interactive work. I want to do an active work. To
me, the most important activity that an art work can provoke is the
activity of thinking. Andy Warhol’s Big Electric Chair (1967) makes me
think, but it is a painting on a museum wall. An active work requires
that I first give of myself.62

62.

Thomas Hirschhorn, in Common Wealth, ed. Morgan, p. 63.
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The independent stance that Hirschhorn asserts in his work—though produced
collaboratively, his art is the product of a single artist’s vision—implies the readmittance of a degree of autonomy to art. Likewise, the viewer is no longer coerced
into fulfilling the artist’s interactive requirements, but is presupposed as a subject
of independent thought, which is the essential prerequisite for political action:
“having reflections and critical thoughts is to get active, posing questions is to
come to life.”63 The Bataille Monument shows that installation and performance art
now find themselves at a significant distance from the historic avant-garde calls to
collapse art and life.

Relational Antagonism
My interest in the work of Thomas Hirschhorn and Santiago Sierra derives
not only from their tougher, more disruptive approach to “relations” than that
proposed by Bourriaud, but also from their remoteness from the socially engaged
public art projects that have sprung up since the 1980s under the aegis of “new
genre public art.” But does the fact that the work of Sierra and Hirschhorn demonstrates better democracy make it better art? For many critics, the answer would be
obvious: of course it does! But the fact that this question arises is itself symptomatic
of wider trends in contemporary art criticism: today, political, moral, and ethical
judgments have come to fill the vacuum of aesthetic judgment in a way that was
unthinkable forty years ago. This is partly because postmodernism has attacked the
very notion of aesthetic judgment, and partly because contemporary art solicits the
viewer’s literal interaction in ever more elaborate ways. Yet the “birth of the viewer”
63.

Ibid., p. 62.
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(and the ecstatic promises of emancipation that accompany it) has not halted
appeals to higher criteria, which have simply returned in other guises.
This is not an issue that can be adequately dealt with here. I wish to point out
only that if the work Bourriaud considers exemplary of “relational aesthetics”
wishes to be considered politically, then we must address this proposition seriously.
There is now a long tradition of viewer participation and activated spectatorship in
works of art across many media—from experimental German theater of the 1920s
to new-wave film and the nouveau roman of the 1960s, from Minimalist sculpture to
post-Minimalist installation art in the 1970s, from Beuys’s social sculpture to 1980s
socially engaged performance art. It is no longer enough to say that activating the
viewer tout court is a democratic act, for every art work—even the most “openended”—determines in advance the depth of participation that the viewer may
have with it.64 Hirschhorn would argue that such pretenses to emancipation are no
longer necessary: all art—whether immersive or not—can be a critical force that
appropriates and reassigns value, distancing our thoughts from the predominant
and preexisting consensus. The tasks facing us today are to analyze how contemporary art addresses the viewer and to assess the quality of the audience relations it
produces: the subject position that any work presupposes and the democratic
notions it upholds, and how these are manifested in our experience of the work.
It can be argued that the works of Hirschhorn and Sierra, as I have presented
them, are no longer tied to the direct activation of the viewer, or to their literal
participation in the work. This is not to say that this work signifies a return to the
kind of high-modernist autonomy advocated by Clement Greenberg, but rather to
a more complicated imbrication of the social and the aesthetic. In this model, the
kernel of impossible resolution on which antagonism depends is mirrored in the
tension between art and society conceived of as mutually exclusive spheres—a selfreflexive tension that the work of Sierra and Hirschhorn fully acknowledges.65
In this light, the motif of obstruction or blockade so frequently found in
Sierra’s works is less a return to modernist refusal as advocated by Theodor Adorno
than an expression of the boundaries of both the social and the aesthetic after a
century of attempts to fuse them.66 In his exhibition at Kunst-Werke in Berlin, viewers were confronted with a series of makeshift cardboard boxes, each of which
64.
I am reminded of Walter Benjamin’s praise of newspapers because they solicit opinions from
their reader (via the letters page) and thereby elevate him/her to the status of a collaborator: “The
reader is at all times ready to become a writer,” he says, “that is, a describer, but also a prescriber . . . he
gains access to authorship” (Benjamin, “The Author as Producer,” in Benjamin, Reflections [New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1978], p. 225). Even so, the newspaper retains an editor, and the letters page is but one among many other authored pages beneath the remit of this editor.
65.
“As the social is penetrated by negativity—that is, by antagonism—it does not attain the status
of transparency, of full presence, and the objectivity of its identities is permanently subverted. From
here onward, the impossible relation between objectivity and negativity has become constitutive of the
social” (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 129).
66.
The blockade or impasse is a recurrent motif in Sierra’s work, such as 68 People Paid to Block the
Entrance to Pusan’s Museum of Contemporary Art, Korea (2000) or 465 People Paid to Stand in a Room at the
Museo Rufino Tamaya, Mexico City (1999).
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concealed a Chechnyan refugee seeking asylum in Germany.67 The boxes were an
Arte Povera take on Tony Smith’s celebrated 6 x 6 foot sculpture Die (1962), the work
that Michael Fried famously described as exerting the same effect on the viewer as
“the silent presence of another person.”68 In Sierra’s piece, this silent presence was literal: since it is against the law in Germany for illegal immigrants to be paid for work,
the refugees’ status could not be announced by the gallery. Their silence was exaggerated and exacerbated by their literal invisibility beneath the cardboard boxes. In
such works, Sierra seems to argue that the phenomenological body of Minimalism is
politicized precisely through the quality of its relationship—or lack of relationship—
to other people. Our response to witnessing the participants in Sierra’s actions—be
they facing the wall, sitting under boxes, or tattooed with a line—is quite different
from the “togetherness” of relational aesthetics. The work does not offer an experience of transcendent human empathy that smooths over the awkward situation
before us, but a pointed racial and economic nonidentification: “this is not me.” The
persistence of this friction, its awkwardness and discomfort, alerts us to the relational
antagonism of Sierra’s work.
The works of Hirschhorn and Sierra stand against Bourriaud’s claims for
relational aesthetics, the microtopian communities of Tiravanija, and the scenario
formalism of Gillick. The feel-good positions adopted by Tiravanija and Gillick are
reflected in their ubiquitous presence on the international art scene, and their
status as perennial favorites of a few curators who have become known for promoting their preferred selection of artists (and thereby becoming touring stars in
their own right). In such a cozy situation, art does not feel the need to defend
itself, and it collapses into compensatory (and self-congratulatory) entertainment.
The work of Hirschhorn and Sierra is better art not simply for being better politics
(although both of these artists now have equally high visibility on the blockbuster
art circuit). Their work acknowledges the limitations of what is possible as art (“I
am not an animator, teacher or social-worker,” says Hirschhorn) and subjects to
scrutiny all easy claims for a transitive relationship between art and society. The
model of subjectivity that underpins their practice is not the fictitious whole subject of harmonious community, but a divided subject of partial identifications
open to constant flux. If relational aesthetics requires a unified subject as a prerequisite for community-as-togetherness, then Hirschhorn and Sierra provide a
mode of artistic experience more adequate to the divided and incomplete subject
of today. This relational antagonism would be predicated not on social harmony,
but on exposing that which is repressed in sustaining the semblance of this harmony. It would thereby provide a more concrete and polemical grounds for
rethinking our relationship to the world and to one other.

67.
Workers Who Cannot Be Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes, Kunst-Werke, Berlin,
(September 2000). Six workers remained inside the boxes for four hours a day for six weeks.
68.
Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” Artforum (Summer 1967), reprinted in Minimal Art, ed. Gregory
Battcock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 128.
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